

National Security Council File

1943 Middle East War, 12 October 1943 - File No. M

3

## DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	report	Preparations in Egypt <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 02-38/1 1p	12 OCT 73	B
2	report	Soviet Airborne Forces <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 02-38/2 1p	12 OCT 73	B
3	report	Soviet's Medit. Fleet <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 02-38/3 1p.	12 OCT 73	B
4	memo	to White House <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 02-38/4 1p	12 OCT 73	B
5	telegram	From AmEmb Amman to Sec State <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 02-38/5 2p	12 OCT 73	B
6	telegram	From AmEmb Amman to Sec State <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 02-38/6 2p.	12 OCT 73	B
7	telegram	From AmEmb Tel Aviv to Sec State <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 02-38/7 2p.	12 OCT 73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE NSC			BOX NUMBER 1174	
FOLDER TITLE (3)				

## RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.  
 B. National security classified information.  
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.  
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.  
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.  
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.  
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

## DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
8	telegram	From AmEmb Amman to Sec State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-38/8 p.	12 OCT 73	B
9	report	ME Hostilities MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02/38/9 7 p.	12 OCT 73	B
10	telegram	From AmEmb Amman to Sec State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-38/10 1p	12 OCT 73	B
11	telegram	From Sec State to AmEmb Lisbon	12 OCT 73	B
12	report	Soviet ship MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-38/11 1p	12 OCT 73	B
13	report	ME Hostilities MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-38/12 5p.	12 OCT 73	B
14	telegram	Amemb Ankara to Sec State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-38/13 3 p.	10/12/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE NSC			BOX NUMBER 1174	
FOLDER TITLE 3				

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET (GDS)

1972 11 11 11 11  
INFORMATION

October 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: William B. Quandt *W B Q*  
SUBJECT: Options in the Middle East

It appears to be increasingly likely that no formal ceasefire will be reached in the Middle East in the near future. Instead, fighting on the Syrian front will subside, but not stop entirely, with Israel in control of a line somewhat to the east of the previous ceasefire lines. Israel would probably be glad to have a ceasefire on the Syrian front in order to turn attention to the more important task of dislodging the Egyptians from Sinai. But there are no reasons for the Syrians to accept such terms unless the alternative is total destruction. Israel might achieve this latter objective, but only at an extraordinarily high price and at a cost in time, which by now is a serious problem for Israel. Each day the war goes on it costs Israel over \$250 million. Within one month, this adds up to Israel's entire annual GNP.

Consequently, the prospect is for a standoff on the Syrian front, with Israel in control of additional, but not very valuable, territory. Within a few days, Israel will have to consider dealing seriously with the Egyptian front. A massive onslaught might succeed, but at heavy cost. Outflanking tactics will not easily work. Airpower cannot alone do the job, and in any event risks heavy losses. The Egyptians seem determined to fight, but on their own terms, which means they will not easily be drawn from the SAM-protected area they now occupy unless Israel's forces are obviously weakened.

Soviet supplies to the Egyptians and Syrians assure that fighting will not stop on the Arab side for lack of equipment. Nor is manpower or financing likely to be a problem. The Arabs are well positioned to fight a prolonged, low-intensity war of attrition that will force the Israelis to remain mobilized and alert. The longer the war goes on, the better their chances.

If the Israelis do manage to force the Egyptian forces back across the Canal, this will not assure a ceasefire. Israel will be reluctant to cross to the west bank to destroy the Egyptian army. Consequently, some form of hostilities, perhaps reminiscent of the first half of 1970, could go on even after Israel gets back to the ceasefire lines. Israeli casualties will mount and the costs of such a war will be very great.

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As the war drags on, several important developments could occur:

- Greater Soviet involvement, such as flying defensive fighter patrols to protect Damascus and Cairo.
- Provision of more advanced Soviet equipment, such as SCUD missiles and TU-22 bombers to the combatants.
- A decrease in Arab oil production, causing serious shortages in Europe, Japan and the United States.
- Attempt to close Bab al-Mandab at the southern entrance of the Red Sea to oil tankers from Iran to Israel.
- Moroccan closure of our communications facilities, thereby degrading the effectiveness of the Sixth Fleet.
- Virtual isolation of the United States as the sole supporter of Israel, thereby complicating diplomatic and military resupply efforts.
- Jordanian involvement in the hostilities will become inevitable.

U. S. Alternatives

1. Continue efforts to build consensus for ceasefire and negotiated peace settlement. Unless the situation on the ground or the costs of the war for both sides change dramatically in the next few days, this alternative seems unlikely to succeed. The Egyptians will resist any proposal requiring them to withdraw from territory they have reoccupied. The Israelis will not willingly stop fighting until they have at least tried an all-out counter-offensive on the Egyptian forces in Sinai. While this approach may eventually succeed, it is bound to take considerable time during which U.S. interests in the Middle East are likely to suffer and Soviet influence to grow.

2. Try for a ceasefire in place and agreement on the first stage of an overall settlement. This effort would try to end the fighting as soon as possible by offering something to both sides. The key issues would involve the Egyptian-Israeli front. If fighting were to stop, Egypt would be in control of an area comparable to that they could have expected to regain in the first stage of any peace settlement. They have now acquired this by force, but no one contests that it is Egyptian territory. The problem is to get the Israelis to accept this outcome of the fighting and to link it to a more general settlement. This would require strong efforts to persuade the Egyptians and Syrians to accept face-to-face negotiations on a phased settlement, complete with arrangements for demilitarization and separation of forces in key areas. Egypt would have to accept the principle that Israeli

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withdrawal will not be automatic, but rather will take place over time, as Egypt takes actions consistent with a full peace agreement. On the Syrian front, no progress would be expected until the Egyptians had begun negotiating. In short, this formula would favor the Egyptians at the outset by letting them keep recaptured territory, but would set the stage for subsequent peace negotiations on terms acceptable to the Israelis. Considerable European, and perhaps even some moderate Arab, support might be generated for such an alternative.

3. Take no action for a ceasefire or a peace settlement at present. U.S. efforts would shift from trying to end the fighting immediately to providing Israel with sufficient economic and military support to insure that a war of attrition will not succeed. The objective, as in 1970, would be to demonstrate that force cannot settle the conflict, that Soviet help to their clients will be met by our efforts to help Israel, whatever the costs to our interests in the Arab world. In the short term the chances for peace would be dim and US-Arab relations would be seriously weakened, but in time one could hope to work again for a negotiated peace once the balance of power in the area had been restored. One would have to anticipate and accept radical changes in the Middle East if we were to adopt this strategy, but vital U.S. interests would probably not suffer excessively. It would however, be several years before we could expect to rebuild the regional network of relations we have been fostering in the Middle East in the past few years.

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David M.  
Somers

FORM DS 322(OCR)

SECRET

S/S:TRPICKERING:JLH

10/12/73

S/S - MR. PICKERING

EUR - MR. STABLER

FLASH

LISBON

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NARR

SUBJ: LAJES BASE

FOR CHARGE

1. WE APPRECIATE YOUR REPORT ON PATRICIO REACTIONS TO OUR REQUEST AND RECOGNIZE THAT HIS DESIRE FOR A COMMITMENT TO GENERAL POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR PORTUGAL AND A COMMITMENT TO SPECIFIC ASSISTANCE FROM US IN THE EVENT THEIR HELP PRODUCES HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES FOR PORTUGAL ARE NOT UNEXPECTED.

2. YOU SHOULD SEE PATRICIO IMMEDIATELY AGAIN OR GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM IN WHATEVER WAY YOU THINK BEST AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

A. WE UNDERSTAND HIS CONCERN AND ARE GRATEFUL THAT HE IS EXAMINING MOST CAREFULLY OUR PROPOSAL.

B. WE ARE, AS HE KNOWS, PREPARED TO BE AS HELPFUL AS WE CAN ON THE QUESTION OF U.S. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION. HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS ONLY THIS SET OF SPECIAL CONDITIONS THAT HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO ENLIST THE ASSISTANCE OF CERTAIN INFLUENTIAL LEGISLATORS IN MOVING MATTERS IN A DIRECTION MORE FAVORABLE TO PORTUGAL. IN ALL FRANKNESS, IF PORTUGAL'S NON-COOPERATION WAS TO STAND IN

SECRET

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

SECRET

12

THE WAY OF OUR PEACE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE BELIEVE THE REACTIONS IN CONGRESS AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE WOULD BE SHARPLY NEGATIVE WITH CONSEQUENT ADVERSE EFFECTS ON U.S.-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS. IN A WORD WE HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO REVERSE A TREND.

C. PATRICIO RECOGNIZES AS WELL AS WE DO THE REAL NEED TO SEEK A DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE PROJECTING OUR EFFORTS BOTH TO OBTAIN A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A DURABLE PEACE IN THAT AREA. WE LOOK UPON THESE MILITARY ASSISTANCE FLIGHTS AS AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR EFFORTS AND HOPE THAT PORTUGAL WILL ASSIST US IN THIS IMPORTANT WORK BY NOT REFUSING US THE TRANSIT RIGHTS WE SEE\*\*SEEK FOR THESE CARGOS AT LAJES. THE BALANCE WE SEEK IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS OF DIRECT AND VITAL CONCERN TO PORTUGAL AND OTHER STATES IN THE GENERAL MEDITERRANEAN AREA.

D. WE HAVE NOTED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT CONCERNING "GENERAL POLITICAL SUPPORT" AND CAN ONLY STRESS THAT U.S. REMAINS ONE OF PORTUGAL'S BEST FRIENDS. THE SECRETARY REGRETS THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO SEE PATRICIO IN NEW YORK, BUT HOPES PATRICIO WILL UNDERSTAND THAT HIS CROWDED SCHEDULE SIMPLY DID NOT MAKE IT POSSIBLE. PATRICIO SHOULD BE DISABUSED THAT ANY SLIGHT OR "DISCRIMINATION" WAS INTENDED. THE SECRETARY LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING WITH PATRICIO AT SOME OTHER TIME.

E. WITH RESPECT TO THE MORE SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES, WE REGRET WE CANNOT COMPLY. AT THE SAME TIME WE UNDERSTAND PORTUGAL'S CONCERNS THAT IT MAY SUBJECT ITSELF TO INCREASED RISKS AS THE RESULT OF A FAVORABLE DECISION ON OUR REQUEST FOR TRANSIT RIGHTS AT LAJES. SHOULD IT DEVELOP THAT PORTUGUESE CONCERNS HAVE A BASIS IN FACT, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER TOGETHER WITH GOP WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO RESTORE THIS\*\*E SITUATION.

F. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THERE ARE COMPELLING AND URGENT REASONS TO EXPECT HELP AND ASSISTANCE FROM GOP. THIS COUNTRY IS DEDICATING ITS FULL EFFORTS ON A ROUND THE CLOCK BASIS TOWARDS FINDING A WAY TO STOPPING HOSTILITY AND BRINGING A DURABLE PEACE; WE KNOW THAT PORTUGAL WILL DO NOT LESS THAN TO PROVIDE ITS CONTRIBUTIONS

SECRET

FORM DS 322A{OCR}

SECRET

13

TO THE RESTORATION OF PEACE.

3. PLEASE ASK THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR AN URGENT DECISION  
AS WE WISH TO BEGIN ENTIRE OPERATION IMMEDIATELY. 44

SECRET

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S E C R E T

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

**NODIS**

FLASH  
DE RUEHC #2479 2851519  
Z 121509Z OCT 73 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LISBON FLASH 6846

S E C R E T STATE 202479

NODIS  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS:MARR  
SUBJECT: LAJES FLIGHTS

EYES ONLY FOR CHARGE

1. YOU SHOULD SEEK AN IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, OR IF HE IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH A SENIOR OFFICIAL WHO HAS HIS TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ASKED TO SEE HIM TO EXPLAIN THAT OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS WE WILL WISH TO-USE THE LAJES BASE FOR THE FLIGHT OF CHARTERED CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. THE AIRCRAFT ARE CHARTERED BY THE UNITED STATES DEFENSE DEPARTMENT. THE FLIGHTS WILL BE CARRYING URGENTLY NEEDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL. WE WILL AVERAGE 10 TO 20 FLIGHTS A DAY. THEY WILL STOP IN LAJES FOR CREW CHANGE AND REFUELING. THEY WILL TOUCH DOWN NOWHERE ELSE ON THEIR WAY TO OR FROM ISRAEL. WE WILL WANT TO BEGIN FLIGHTS TONIGHT.

3- WE BELIEVE THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FRANKLY INFORMED OF OUR INTENTIONS. WE WOULD HOPE THAT AT THE BARE MINIMUM THEY WOULD RECEIVE THIS INFORMATION WITHOUT FURTHER COMMENT AS TO THE USE OF THE BASE. WE WISH OF COURSE TO AVOID THEIR REFUSING TO PERMIT US TO USE THIS BASE.

4. YOU MAY TELL THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT WE CONSIDER THIS A VERY IMPORTANT PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN

**NODIS**

PSN:000791

PAGE 01

TDR:344/15:26Z

DTG:121509Z OCT 73

\*\*\*\*\*

S E C R E T

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

**MODIS**

\*\*\*\*\*

**S E C R E T**

\*\*\*\*\*S CDPV

THE BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH WILL BRING A DURABLE PEACE TO THE REGION. WE WILL NOT FORGET PORTUGUESE HELP AND COOPERATION IN THIS EFFORT.

5. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE PORTUGUESE THAT THIS ACTIVITY IS BEING CARRIED ON AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF A LARGE SOVIET AERIAL RESUPPLY EFFORT IN EGYPT, SYRIA AND IRAQ WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS.

6. WE HOPE AND TRUST THE PORTUGUESE WILL RESPECT OUR CONFIDENCE IN THIS MATTER. WE INTEND NO PUBLICITY. WE OF COURSE CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT OVER TIME THE FLIGHTS WILL ESCAPE PUBLIC NOTICE.. IF THEY COME TO PUBLIC NOTICE WE INTEND TO SAY ONLY THAT OUR ONGOING SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP TO ISRAEL IS OF COURSE WELL KNOWN; WE NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY SPECIFIC INFORMATION RELATING TO THAT RELATIONSHIP.

7. WE ARE ALSO CALLING IN PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR TODAY TO INFORM HIM OF YOUR APPROACH TO PATRICIO AND TO REQUEST HIS SUPPORT FOR OUR DEMARCHE. KISSINGER  
BT

**MODIS**

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COPY \_\_\_\_\_ OF 15 COPIES

*Walt*

SECRET

CONTROL: 3317Q

RECD: 12 OCT '73 2:08P

Z 121302Z OCT 73 ZFFA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4924  
BT  
SECRET STATE 202678

NODIS

*HAK -> Hussein*

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, US  
SUBJ: KING'S LATEST LETTER TO SECRETARY

*10/12*

REF: AMMAN 5453

1. YOU SHOULD PASS FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE TO KING FROM  
SECRETARY:

QUOTE: YOUR MAJESTY:

I HAVE YOUR MESSAGE WHICH AMBASSADOR BROWN HAS JUST TRANSMITTED. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BRING ABOUT AN EARLY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN A WAY WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN YOUR AREA. IN THE MEANTIME, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO CIRCUMSCRIBE THE AREA AND SCALE OF THE CONFLICT. WE ALL FACE A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION, BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WITH STEADY NERVES, WISDOM, AND COURAGE WE CAN YET BRING SOME GOOD OUT OF THE DISASTER WHICH HAS AGAIN STRUCK THE MIDDLE EAST. I HAVE BEEN URGING RESTRAINT ON THE ISRAELIS, AND IT IS THEREFORE EQUALLY IMPORTANT FOR YOUR FORCES TO ACT WITH CIRCUMSPECTION.

*no effect*

SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER

UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

BT

#2678

DRAFTED BY: NEA: DAKORN: ALATHERTON APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY  
CLEARANCES: NEA: JJSISCO S/S- GAMMON

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

SECRET

CC 1 8 OF 15 *Waw*

CONTROL: 3 3 7 6Q

① Z 1853Z OCT 73 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY LISBON FLASH 6850  
BT  
SECRET STATE 202706

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR  
SUBJECT: LAJES BASE

1. STABLER HAS SEEN THEMIDO HERE ON REQUEST TO USE LAJES.
2. THEMIDO MADE POINT THAT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE AND SALES TO PORTUGAL WERE INCONSISTENT WITH REQUEST WHICH USG NOW MAKING.
3. SENATOR HENRY JACKSON CONFIRMS THAT HE WILL ASSIST US, ALONG WITH ISRAELI SUPPORTERS ON HILL, IN EFFORT TO REMOVE THIS RESTRICTION AGAINST PORTUGAL IF PORTUGUESE SUPPORT FOR USE OF LAJES BASE IN SENSE OF US REQUEST IS FORTHCOMING.
4. YOU AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY THIS TO PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER. KISSINGER

S/S:TRPICKERING:AL  
10/12/73  
S/S:THOMAS R. PICKERING

SECRET

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SECRET

COP 10 OF 15 COPIES

*Department of State*

*W4*  
*War*

CONTROL: 3 3 6 7Q

①  
Z 122013Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY MADRID FLASH 4405  
BT  
S E C R E T STATE 202843

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS 2  
TAGS: PINR  
SUBJECT: XXXX

REF.: STATE 201358

FYI PLANE WILL ACCOMPLISH MISSION BY LAUNCHING FROM AND  
RECOVERING AT US BASE WITHOUT INTERVENING TOUCHDOWN.  
WILL REFUEL FROM TORREJON OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN  
ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN. ETD USA BASE 0600Z OCTOBER  
13; ETA US BASE 1700Z 13 OCTOBER. KISSINGER

INR/DDC - JRGARDNER:SP  
10/12/73 EXT. 21506  
S/S - MR. PICKERING

NEA - MR. SISCO

EUR - MR. STABLER

SECRET

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FRIS 143

BANGLADESH OFFERS AID TO EGYPT, SYRIA ✓

0121618 Dacca OVERSEAS SERVICE IN BENGALI 1500 GMT 12 OCT 73 D

(TEXT) PRIME MINISTER BANGABANDHU SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN HAS PROPOSED SENDING ~~MEDICAL TEAMS~~ TO EGYPT AND SYRIA TO AID PERSONS WOUNDED IN THE WAR. IN Dacca TODAY, FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HUSSAIN INFORMED THE NEWLY APPOINTED EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TO BANGLADESH, WAFI HIJAZI, ABOUT BANGABANDHU'S OFFER.. A MESSAGE WAS SENT TO THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE FROM VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND PEOPLE IN BANGLADESH. MANY FREEDOM FIGHTERS ARE ANXIOUS TO FIGHT ALONGSIDE THEIR ARAB BROTHERS.

THE AMBASSADOR WAS OVERWHELMED BY THE FRIENDLY GESTURES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF BANGLADESH AND THANKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF HIS COUNTRY.

12 OCT 1735Z MJO/GFE

~~1973~~ 1973 War

too much

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Department of State

Was  
**TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 560

PAGE 01 ANKARA 08133 121517Z

S2  
ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00

USSS-00 CIAE-00 DODC-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-15 SAJ-01 DRC-01 /160 W  
087571

R 121405Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1341  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USCINCEUR  
USUN NY 1466  
USDOCOSOUTH  
USNATO 2780  
AMCONSUL ADANA  
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL  
AMCONSUL IZMIR  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
USINT BAGHDAD  
USINT CAIRO  
USINT ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA 8133

F.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, XX, TU  
SUBJ: TURK POSITION ON MIDDLE EAST CONFLIT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 08133 121517Z

REF: A. ANKARA 8047; B. ANKARA 8051

SUMMARY: TURKEY TO DATE HAS MAINTAINED A FAIRLY EVEN HANDED STANCE IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, DESPITE EFFORTS BY ARAB DIPLOMATS HERE TO PUSH THE TURKS INTO A POSITION MORE FAVORABLE TO THEM, OR AT LEAST TO REINFORCE IMPRESSION THAT GO AND TURK PUBLIC ARE SYMPATHETIC TO ARAB CAUSE. ISRAELI EMBASSY, HOWEVER, IS NOT DISSATISFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. END SUMMARY.

1. FROM STATEMENTS IT HAS ISSUED SO FAR RELATING TO ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, TURKEY HAS MAINTAINED A FAIRLY EVEN-HANDED ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE TWO SIDES. IN ITS OCTOBER 9 STATEMENT (REF A), THE FOREIGN MINISTRY REITERATED ITS STANDARD CALL FOR LASTING SETTLEMENT UNDER SC RES 242, BUT EXPLICITLY STRESSED NEED WITHIN THAT RESOLUTION FOR EVACUATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES SEIZED BY FORCE. OCT 10, BY OBSERVING THAT COMMON DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS ARE TO USED ONLY FOR NATO PURPOSES (AND BY IMPLICATION NOT BY US FOR ASSISTANCE TO ISRAELI-REF B), THE GOV IS HARDLY EXPOSING A NEW POSITION.

2. ARAB EMISSARIES IN ANKARA, HOWEVER, PUBLICLY ARE REVEALING THEIR HOPES AND EFFORTS TO DRAW TURKEY IN ON SIDE OF ARABS PRESS AND RADIO REPORTS THAT AMBASSADOR OF KUWAIT HERE THANKED FORMIN BAYULKEN OCTOBER 11 ON BEHALF OF ARAB COUNTRIES FOR TURKEY'S PRO-ARAB POLICY, AS WELL AS FOR ANNOUNCEMENT THAT JOINT DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS WOULD NOT BE USED AGAINST ARAB INTERESTS. PRESS ALSO REPORTED SYRIAN AMBASSADOR AS HAVING DELIVERED MESSAGE FROM SYRIAN PRESIDENT TO TURKISH PRESIDENT REQUESTING TURKEY'S SUPPORT IN THE CONFLICT.

A FEW TURK OFFICIALS HAVE DRYLY OBSERVED TO US THAT ARAB DIPLOMATS ARE TRYING HARD TO REINFORCE IMPRESSION THAT GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS PUBLIC OPINION ARE FULLY BEHIND THE ARAB CAUSE; AND SOME RESENTMENT WAS EXPRESSED OVER THE EGYPTIAN ENVOY'S REPORTED HINT TO JOURNALIST THAT TURKEY MIGHT SOMEDAY NEED ARAB SUPPORT IN US FOR CYPRUS QUESTION.

3. IN CONTRAST WITH KUWAITI AMBASSADOR'S PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF PLEASURE, WE UNDERSTAND FROM PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THAT THE ARABS ACTUALLY ARE RATHER DISAPPOINTED WITH TURKEY'S CARE-

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 08133 121517Z

FUL STANCE. THE ISRAELI CHARGE HAS TOLD US HIS SATISFACTION WITH THE TURK POSITION, WHICH WAS MORE EVEN HANDED THAN HE HAD EXPECTED. DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 10, HE OBSERVED THAT "WE DO NOT SEE EYE TO EYE WITH TURKEY" WITH RESPECT TO SC 242; HE LATER TOLD US THAT, ASIDE FROM BEING TRUE THIS REMARK MIGHT HELP TURK FOREIGN BAYULKEN WITH THE ARAB EMBASSIES HERE.

4. THE ARAB EFFORTS MAY HAVE MORE SUCCESS WITH PUBLIC OPINION IN TURKEY. IN ANY CASE, THE TURKISH PRESS OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS HAS BEEN EXPRESSING ITS SYMPATHY FOR THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN CAUSE, GENERALLY DECLARING AS JUSTIFIED THE EFFORT OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES TO REGAIN THE LAND THEY HAD LOST IN 1967; HOWEVER, THE NEWSPAPERS ALSO HAVE CAUTIONED AGAINST EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE

ISRAEL. THEY HAVE EXPRESSED SIGNS OF UNEASINESS OVER A POSSIBLE BIG POWER CONFRONTATION RESULTING FROM THE CONFLICT, AND OVER THE PROSPECTS OF A FUTURE OIL SHORTAGE FACING THE WEST, INCLUDING TURKEY.  
MACOMBER

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Department of State  
**TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 837

PAGE 01 KARACH 02150 121202Z

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03  
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC 03  
SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-19 ID-15 NIC-01 CU-04 EUR-25 SY-10  
OPR-02 DRC-01 USSS-00 SSU-00 NSCE-00 MC-02 /164 W  
085776

R 121135Z OCT 73  
FM AMCONSUL KARACHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7597  
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMCONSUL LAHORE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE KARACHI 2150

F.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PINS, ASFC, PK  
SUBJECT: PRO-ARAB DEMONSTRATIONS KARACHI

REF: ISLAMABAD 8753, ISLAMABAD 8844, LAHORE 2181  
LAHORE 2184

1. THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW PRO-ARAB DEMONSTRATIONS  
OCTOBER 10, 11, AND 12 IN KARACHI, SOME OF THEM WITH  
ANTI-AMERICAN CONTENT. FOR THE MOST PART, THEY HAVE BEEN  
MILD IN TONE, AND RATHER EASILY CONTAINED BY KARACHI POLICE,  
WHO ADVISE US THEY HAVE STRICT ORDERS NOT TO LET DEMONSTRATORS  
NEAR CONGEN BUILDING. IN FACT, POLICE, AT OWN INITIATIVE, RE-  
INFORCED CONTINGENT AT CONGEN BUILDING 9 OCTOBER AND AT ONE  
POINT 12 OCTOBER, WHEN STUDENT PROCESSION EXPRESSED DETERMI-  
NATION TO COME TO CONGEN BUILDING, POLICE CONTINGENT AS LARGE  
AS 40 CONSTABLES AND OFFICERS CAMPED AT CONGEN BUILDING.

2. FIRST KARACHI DEMONSTRATION WAS AFTERNOON 10 OCTOBER  
BY TEHRIK-I-ISTIQLAL KARACHI BRANCH, COMPRISING ONLY

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 KARACH 02150 121202Z

11 DEMONSTRATORS WHO WERE PROMPTLY PICKED UP BY POLICE FOR VIOLATING SECTION 144. SAME EVENING STUDENTS OF DOW MEDICAL COLLEGE DEMONSTRATED BRIEFLY.

3. ONLY DEMONSTRATION 11 OCTOBER WAS 20-25 MEMBERS OF JINNAH STUDENT FEDERATION WHO SHOUTED SLOGANS ABOUT HALF AND HALF ANTI-ISRAELI, ANTI-U.S. GROUP WANTED TO PROCEED TO U.S. CONGEN BUT WAS PREVENTED BY POLICE.

4. MORNING OCTOBER 12 LARGE GROUP SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS FROM POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE IN SITE INDUSTRIAL AREA ASSEMBLED NEARBY SADDAR DISTRICT AND SIGNIFIED INTENTION MARCHING ON U.S. CONGEN. THIS IS ONLY GROUP THAT HAD APPARENTLY NOT RPT NOT SIGNALLED ITS INTENTIONS IN ADVANCE AND POLICE SOMEWHAT TAKEN BY SURPRISE, BUT ARRIVED IN STRENGTH WITHIN HOUR AND CONTAINED GROUP FOUR BLOCKS FROM CONGEN BEFORE DISPERSING IT.

5. AFTERNOON OCTOBER 12 TWO GROUPS OF ABOUT 100 EACH HELD PROCESSIONS: JI-AFFILIATED STUDENT GROUP HAD TO BE STOPPED BY POLICE FROM APPROACHING CONGEN; AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE DISPERSED OF ITS OWN ACCORD SOME DISTANCE FROM CONGEN BUILDING.

6. COMMENT: AS IN LAHORE NO DOUBT POLICE CARRYING OUT STRICT ORDERS KEEP DEMONSTRATORS AWAY FROM U.S. INSTALLATIONS. HOWEVER ESTIMATE THAT VARIOUS GROUPS WILL KEEP TRYING AND MAY BECOME MORE DETERMINED AS MIDDLE EAST WAR DRAGS ON, ESPECIALLY IF TIDE TURNS DECISIVELY AGAINST ARABS AND NEWS MEDIA CONTINUE PLAYING UP ALLEGATIONS OF U.S. SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL.  
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12656 122004Z

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ACTION LHR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-15 NEA-10

SAD-01 DRC-01 /148 W

090331

O R 121500Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2962

DIA WASHDC

INFO CNO WASHDC

COMSIXTHFLT

CINCSNAVEUR

CINCEUR

CINCUSAFF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 12656

F.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PPR, UR

SUBJ: SOVIET DEMARCHE ON ALLEGED AIR INCIDENTS OVER MEDITERRANEAN

1. DEPUTY CHIEF OF MFA USA DIVISION MIKHAYLOV TELEPHONED  
POL COUNSEL EVENING OF OCTOBER 12 AND UNDER INSTRUCTIONS  
READ DEMARCHE DRAWING U.S. ATTENTION TO CASES IN RECENT DAYS  
IN WHICH AMERICAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT FLEW DANGEROUSLY  
CLOSELY TO AEROFLOT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN AIR SPACE OVER  
THE OPEN SEA NEAR THE ISLAND OF CRETE.

2. DEMARCHE STATED THAT SOVIETS EXPECT U.S. TO TAKE NECESSARY  
MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT U.S. MILITARY PILOTS STRICTLY OBSERVE  
THE SPIRIT OF THE INCIDENTS AT SEA AGREEMENT AND THE PRINCIPLE  
OF FREEDOM OF FLIGHT OVER THE OPEN SEA.  
DURS

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PAGE 01 ALGIER 02196 111516Z

44  
ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-25 NEA-10 IO-15 OMB-01 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03  
RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-19 DRC-01  
SSO-00 SCA-01 NSCE-00 CFD-00 USSS-00 /162 W  
\*\*\*\*\* 075299

P R 121218Z OCT 73  
FM USINT ALGIERS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9693  
INFO AMEMBASSY BERN  
USMISSION UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 2196

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, AG, XF  
SUBJ: ALGERIAN CONTACT WITH SWISS AMBASSADOR RE MIDDLE EAST

1. SWISS AMBASSADOR VALLOTTON WAS CALLED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY BY DEPSEC GEN BENHABYLES OCTOBER 10. BENHABYLES REVIEWED ALGERIAN POSITION IN MODERATE WAY ALONG LINES OF BRIEFING GIVEN DIPLOMATS OCTOBER 8 (ALGIERS 2175).

2. AT END OF CONVERSATION BENHABYLES CAUTIOUSLY RAISED POSSIBILITY THAT SWITZERLAND MIGHT LATER HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN BRINGING ABOUT CONTACTS LEADING TO SOLUTION IN MIDDLE EAST SIMILAR TO ITS ROLE AS HOST FOR SECRET CONTACTS DURING FRENCH-ALGERIAN STRUGGLE.

3. AMBASSADOR VALLOTTON REMAINS PUZZLED RE PURPOSE OF CONVERSATION BUT BELIEVES, AS WE DO, THAT ALGERIANS ARE LOOKING FOR A DIPLOMATIC ROLE TO PLAY THAT MIGHT EVENTUALLY HELP ACHIEVE A LASTING SOLUTION IN MIDDLE EAST ON ARAB TERM. WE NOTE THAT FUMMIN BOUTEFILKA LEFT FOR NEW YORK OCTOBER 10.  
EAGLETON

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TELEGRAM  
10/12

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PAGE 01 USUN N 03945 160113Z

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ACTION 10-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CCO-00 USSS-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19

AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 NEA-10 OMB-01 DRC-01 /185 W  
----- 112115

R 160050Z OCT 73  
FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 220

UNCLAS USUN 3945

E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS: PFOR, UN, US, IS, EG

SUBJ: EGYPTIAN STATEMENT OF CONCERN RE REPORTED US  
ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL

*Text of Egyptian 10/12  
protest to US via USUN  
to Kennedy*

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY "OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN"  
OF EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT MADE ON OCTOBER 12, BUT RECEIVED AT  
USUN OCTOBER 15, EXPRESSING CONCERN AT VARIOUS REPORTS  
CONCERNING ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL:

"REPORTS WERE CIRCULATED LATELY ABOUT AN ENDEAVOUR ON  
THE PART OF THE US TO SHIP URGENT CONSIGNMENTS OF ARMAMENTS TO  
ISRAEL. SOME OF THESE REPORTS--DISSEMINATED BY SEVERAL  
WESTERN NEWS AGENCIES--HAVE REFERRED TO A CERTAIN SHIPMENT WHICH  
WAS ALREADY SENT TO ISRAEL FROM AN AMERICAN AIR BASE.

"FURTHERMORE, AN AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE HAS  
DECIDED TO APPROPRIATE A SPECIAL FUND IN THE MINISTRY OF  
DEFENSE IN ORDER TO FINANCE SUPPLYING ISRAEL WITH TANKS AND LIGHT  
ARMS, WITH A VIEW TO OFFSETTING ITS LOSSES DURING THE WAR.

"IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS PROPAGATED,  
SIMULTANEOUSLY, STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO SOME AMERICAN  
OFFICIALS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE USSR SUPPLIES EGYPT

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PAGE 02 USUN N 03945 160113Z

AND SYRIA WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENTS SHIPPED BY AIR.

"THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT FOLLOWS WITH GREAT CONCERN SUCH NEWS WHICH INDICATE AN OBVIOUS PROVOCATION TO THE SENTIMENTS OF THE ARAB NATION IN THIS CRUCIAL STAGE OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. THE USA, INDEED, BEARS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SUPPORTING THE ISRAELI AGGRESSORS IN THIS CONFLICT, POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY.

"THE AMERICAN SUPPORT TO ISRAEL HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE LATTER--THROUGHOUT MORE THAN SIX YEARS SINCE THE JUNE 1967 WAR--TO DEFY THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, TO CONTINUE ITS OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORIES USURPED FROM THREE ARAB STATES, AND TO BLOCK THE SUEZ CANAL BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION, THUS INFLECTING SERIOUS ECONOMIC DAMAGES TO THE MAJORITY OF WORLD'S STATES.

"THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT SOLEMNLY WARNS FROM (OF) THE CONSEQUENCES ARISING FROM THE CONTINUATION OF THE AMERICAN POLICY IN ITS ABSOLUTE SUPPORT TO THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND SUPPLYING IT WITH ARMS DEVICES WHICH ARE USED IN ATTACKING INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN EGYPT AND SYRIA.".

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12634 121615Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-21 TO-15 ISU-00 NEA-10 EURE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00

USSS-00 NSCE-00 USIC-00 SS-20 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01

PKS-01 SPC-03 ACDA-19 DRC-01 AF-10 /142 W  
088033

O R (121528Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2944  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USUN NY

CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 12634

F.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, UR, XF  
SUBJ: GROMYKO MEETING WITH ARAB AMBASSADORS

1. SUMMARY. JORDANIAN DIPLOMAT (PROTECT) TOLD US OCTOBER 11 THAT DURING 90 MINUTE MEETING BETWEEN SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AND FIVE ARAB AMBASSADORS MORNING OCTOBER 10 AMBASSADORS HAD EXPRESSED ARAB APPRECIATION FOR SOVIET SUPPORT IN WAR AND GROMYKO HAS RESPONDED WITH TWO BASIC POINTS: (1) PRESENT ME CONFLICT IS ONE WHICH ARAB STATES MUST PROSECUTE THEMSELVES; AND (2) IT WOULD BE TWO TO THREE DAYS BEFORE ANY DECISIVE TURN WOULD ALLOW MOVEMENT TOWARD MEANINGFUL UN ACTION ON THE ME WAR. END SUMMARY.

2. JORDANIAN SAID IN REGARD TO FIRST POINT THAT GROMYKO HAD EMPHASIZED NEED FOR OTHER ARAB STATES TO SUPPORT ME COMBATANTS. HE SPECIFICALLY NOTED TO IRAQI AMBASSADOR THAT "SYRIA EXPECTS YOUR HELP," AND HE MADE SIMILAR POINT TO ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR.

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3. ON JORDANIAN POSITION EMBOFF WAS OBLIQUE CONCERNING ANY DIRECT SOVIET APPROACH ABOUT JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT PRESSURE ON KING WAS GREAT (HE NOTED THAT IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ARRIVED IN AMMAN OCTOBER 11 AND JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO EGYPT HAD RETURNED TO JORDAN WITH EGYPTIAN REQUEST FOR JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION). NONETHELESS, HE SAID THAT KING WAS STILL DETERMINED TO STAY OUT OF CONFLICT, AND HE FELT THAT HUSSEIN COULD HOLD OUT IF WAR DID NOT LAST MORE THAN TWO TO THREE WEEKS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER SOVIETS HAD ADDRESSED APPEAL TO LIBYA SIMILAR TO THAT SENT TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS, EMBOFF SAID HE DID NOT THINK SO. HE ADDED THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW QADHAFI HAD CONTRIBUTED NOTHING TO WAR EFFORT SO FAR DESPITE HIS STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT EGYPT AND SYRIA FINANCIALLY.

4. ON SECOND POINT, GROMYKO TOLD AMBASSADORS SOVIETS BELIEVED IT WOULD BE AT LEAST TWO TO THREE DAYS BEFORE ANY DECISIVE STAGE IN THE ME WAR WAS REACHED. SOVIETS DID NOT, ACCORDINGLY, EXPECT ANY SERIOUS MOVEMENT AT UN UNTIL SUNDAY OR MONDAY (OCTOBER 14 OR 15). ACCORDING TO JORDANIAN, GROMYKO FULLY ENDORSED ARAB POSITION THAT SOLUTION TO ME SITUATION WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE RESTORATION OF ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND INDICATED THAT ANY SC RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO REFLECT THIS POSITION. AT SAME TIME, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, JORDANIAN SAID HE BELIEVED IT CLEAR THAT SOVIETS WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY EFFORT BY ARAB STATES TO CROSS PRE-JUNE 1967 BORDERS.

5. ON US ME ROLE JORDANIAN TOLD EMBOFF THAT DURING COURSE OF MEETING WITH GROMYKO IRAQI AMBASSADOR HAD RAISED QUESTION OF US INVOLVEMENT IN ME WAR. GROMYKO REPORTEDLY TOLD IRAQI THAT NOW WAS NOT THE TIME TO TALK ABOUT INTERVENTION BY OUTSIDE FORCES AND CLOSED DISCUSSION OF THE POINT.  
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PAGE 01 SOFIA 01376 121422Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISU-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 USIA-15 PRS-01

NEA-10 AF-10 IO-15 NIC-01 AUDA-19 UPR-02 SY-10 OC-06

CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DRC-01 USSS-00 /170 W  
088983

R 121320Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7126  
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SOFIA 1376

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, BU, XF

SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HITS US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

REF: A) SOFIA 1363; B) VIENNA 8396

1. "RABOTNICHESKO DELO" OCTOBER 12 CARRIES FIRST  
MAJOR STORIES OF "US GROWING SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL"  
IN PRESENT CONFLICT.

2. MAJOR WRAP UP OF SITUATION CARRIES SUB HEADLINES  
"ACTIVIZATION OF PRO ISRAELI FORCES IN USA" WITH STORY  
QUOTING AFP OF ISRAELI 707 LOADING ARMS AND AMMUNI-  
TION AT VIRGINIA BEACH. SAME STORY CARRIES DISPATCH  
FROM BTA NEW YORK CHARGING THAT "ZIONISTS IN US WHICH  
HAVE MAJOR INFLUENCE IN POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL

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CIRCLES" ARE PRESSING CONGRESS FOR DIRECT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL. SENATOR JACKSON SINGLED OUT AS LEADING PROPONENT OF INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

3. OTHER PAPERS CARRY SAME THEME, ALBEIT IN MORE MUTED FASHION. NO MENTION MADE OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO ARAB STATES, NOR HAS BULGARIAN MEDIA CARRIED MENA REPORT OF US STRAFING.

4. COMMENT: AS FIGHTING CONTINUES GOR MEDIA DEVOTING MORE ATTENTION TO STORY. ALTHOUGH ISSUE OF WHO FIRED FIRST SHOT NO LONGER CURRENT, MEDIA MAKES CLEAR THAT "TOTAL BLAME LIES WITH ISRAEL" FOR LATEST OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING. PRESS CARRIED ZHIVKOV'S REMARKS AT AUSTRIAN STATE DINNER OCTOBER 9 IN WHICH HE DENOUNCED ISRAELI AGGRESSION (REFTEL B) BUT DID NOT CARRY CHANCELLOR KREISKY'S REBUTTAL FOLLOWING DAY. CAN EXPECT INCREASED SPECULATION REGARDING US SUPPORT TO ISRAEL PARTICULARLY IF SOVIETS AND OTHERS ARE IN PROCESS OF SUPPLYING EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS.  
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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12635 121626Z

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ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NEA-06 SSO-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00  
CIAE-00 DODE-00 CCO-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 PRS-01 L-02  
PM-03 ACDA-10 SAJ-01 INR-10 INRE-00 EURE-00 DRC-01  
RSC-01 /070 W

088160

Q 121528Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2945

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 12635

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F.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, XF, UR, US  
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST: SOVIET NEWSMAN SUGGESTS ARMS LIMITATION ✓  
AGREEMENT

1. SUMMARY: NEW YORK TIMES CORRESPONDENTS HEDRICK SMITH CALLED AFTERNOON OCTOBER 12 TO REPORT THAT NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT HAD SUGGESTED DURING LUNCHEON OCTOBER 10 THAT US-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON LIMITING ARMS SHIPMENTS MIGHT NOW BE GOOD WAY TO CONTAIN CONFLICT IN MIDDLE EAST.  
END SUMMARY.

2. AT LUNCHEON, WHICH WAS ARRANGED PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN MIDDLE EAST, NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT TED RUKHADZE (PROECT) ASKED SMITH WHETHER IT WOULD NOT AT THIS POINT BE A GOOD IDEA IF US AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS AGREED TO LIMIT ARMS SHIPMENTS TO MIDDLE EAST AS A MEANS OF CONTAINING THE CONFLICT IN THAT AREA. SMITH REPLIED THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT USG HAD LONG SOUGHT SUCH AN AGREEMENT BUT TO NO AVAIL.

3. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THIS IDEA WAS BEING WIDELY DISCUSSED IN

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OFFICIAL OR JOURNALISTIC CIRCLES, RUKHADZE REPLIED THAT IT WAS HIS OWN IDEA. (RUKHADZE DID NOT SUGGEST THAT HIS COMMENTS BE PASSED TO EMBASSY OR ANYBODY ELSE.)

4. SMITH SAID HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT IDEA WAS GOOD ONE BUT THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT ANY SUCH AGREEMENT CONTINUE AFTER A CEASEFIRE WERE ACHIEVED. RUKHADZE AGREED.

5. SMITH ASKED HOW OTHER STATES WOULD BE AFFECTED BY SUCH AN ARRANGMENT. RUKHADZE REPLIED THAT HE ASSUMED THAT OTHER COMBATANTS (I.E., THOSE WHO HAD DECLARED WAR AGAINST ISRAEL) WOULD BE FREE TO ASSIST ALLIES. BUT NON-COMBATANTS WOULD BE CALLED UPON TO REFRAIN FROM SUPPLYING ARMS TO PARTIES AT WAR.

6. SMITH REPORTS THAT THIS WAS ONLY SUBSTANTIVE TIME DISCUSSED DURING LUNCHEON AND THAT DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST WAS INITIATED BY RUKHADZE. RUKHADZE USED TO WORK IN NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION OF NOVOSIT AND WAS RECENTLY TRANSFERRED TO CENTRAL POLITICAL SECTION. SMITH INFORMS ME THAT ASSOCIATE OF RUKHADZE'S GAVE SMITH HINT THAT SUMMIT MEETING OF 1972 WOULD TAKE PLACE DESPITE MINING OF HAIPHONG HARBOR.

7. COMMENT: WE HAVE HAD NO SUGGESTION FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL, THAT ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION HERE. NEVERTHELESS, ON THE OUTSIDE CHANCE THAT THIS IS A TRIAL BALLOON, IT IS OBVIOUSLY WORTH PURSUING IF NOT ALREADY DISCUSSED RECENTLY WITH SOVIET IN WASHINGTON CONVERSATION, ABOUT WHICH UNFORTUNATELY WE ARE COMPLETELY IN THE DARK.  
DUBS

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 637

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12060 121143Z

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 TO-15 ISO-00 SS-20 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

USIA-15 ACDA-19 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 AF-10

EUR-25 OMB-01 DRC-01 EB-11 /171 W

085564

P 121101Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4710  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USCINCEUR  
DIA  
USINT CAIRO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 12060

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, LE, IS  
SUBJECT: LEBANESE INVOLVEMENT IN HOSTILITIES

1. LEBANESE MINDEF ISSUED OFFICIAL STATEMENT EVENING OCT 11 ON LEBANON'S POLICY RE PRESENT ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES. HE SAID THAT LEBANON'S ROLE, AS DEFINED BY ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL, IS NOT RPT NOT THAT OF COMBATANT. IN EVENT OF ATTACK, "PRECISE ORDERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN ARMED FORCES TO DEFEND COUNTRY" BUT GOL STILL ADHERES TO 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. MALOUF REFERRED TO ROCKETS WHICH HIT ARMY BARRACKS AT KHAM (NOTE: FIRED BY FEDAYEEN ON OCT 10) AS BEING WORK "OF IRRESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS SEEKING CREATE TROUBLE". HE SAID THAT FEDAYEEN

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12060 121143Z

LEADERS HAVE COMPLIED WITH "IMPERATIVES OF NATIONAL INTEREST WITHIN LIMITS OF THEIR MEANS AND ORGANIZATION". HE ADDED THAT ROLE ASSIGNED TO FEDAYEEN BY "SUPREME ARAB COMMAND" IS TO FIGHT ON "FRONTS WHERE THERE IS COMBAT" AND THAT THEY MUST NOT FIGHT ON OTHER FRONTS WHICH ARE NOT INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES.

2. AMBASSADOR WAS TOLD OCT 11 THAT PRIMIN MEETING ALL MAJOR FEDAYEEN LEADERS TO EXPLAIN NECESSITY AVOID PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS. MINDEF STATEMENT MEANT TO DEFINE GOL POLICY OF NEUTRALITY AND SERVE AS WARNING TO FEDAYEEN. ARMY CONTINUING DO WHAT IT CAN PREVENT BORDER CROSSINGS AND, WHERE POSSIBLE, CROSS-BORDER FIRING. DECON 10/12/74.  
RUFFUM

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**TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 506

PAGE 01 RABAT 04660 121102Z

14  
ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 ISD-00 CIAE-00 DODF-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SS0-00  
USTE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01  
PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15 ACDA-19 IO-15 CCO-00 USSS-00  
AID-20 INRE-00 NEA-10 EUR-25 DRC-01 /165 W  
\*\*\*\*\* 085224

O 120345Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 342

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 4660

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA ONE LINE 10)

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: XI MO MOPS  
SUBJECT: MIDEAST SITUATION

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY AT 0230 THIS MORNING TO SEE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER MUHAMMAD BAHNINI. LATTER APOLOGIZED FOR LATE HOUR AND SAID MILITARY EVENTS IN NEAR EAST TAKING ALARMING TURN. IT APPEARED UNITED STATES INTERVENING ON SIDE OF ISRAEL. MOROCCANS DESIRED PEACEFUL AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION. GIVEN LONG TIES OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND GIVEN PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN KING HASSAN AND PRESIDENT NIXON GOM ASKED THAT UNITED STATES DO ITS BEST TO BRING ABOUT SUCH SOLUTION AND NOT THROW ITS WEIGHT INTO SCALES ON SIDE OF ISRAEL. SYRIA AND EGYPT HAD ACTED AS THEY HAD FOR REASONS OF PRIDE AND BECAUSE THEY DESPAIRED OVER PEACEFUL SOLUTION. MOROCCANS WOULD HAVE WISHED THAT EVENTS NOT COME TO PRESENT PASS, BUT HAVING ARRIVED THERE HOPED THAT UNITED STATES WOULD SUPPORT EQUITY AND JUSTICE IN SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

2. I ASKED WHAT, SPECIFICALLY, HAD PROVOKED MOROCCAN

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 RABAT 04660 121102Z

ALARM OVER UNITED STATES' ROLE. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE REPORTS WE WERE SUPPLYING EQUIPMENT AND VOLUNTEERS TO ISRAEL. VOLUNTEERS ONE THING, BUT EQUIPMENT SOMETHING ELSE AGAIN. I SAID I AM ASTONISHED BECAUSE WE HAD SEEN NO REPORT OF ANY SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL AID TO ISRAEL ON PART USG SINCE OCTOBER 6, WAS THERE SOME REPORT IN PARTICULAR MOROCCANS HAD IN MIND? BAHNINI SAID MOROCCANS HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT WE HAD SUPPLIED ISRAELIS WITH NEW AIRCRAFT DURING PAST 48 HOURS.

3. I TOLD BAHNINI I WOULD TRANSMIT MOROCCANS CONCERNS TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY AND WOULD COMMUNICATE ANSWER TO HIM AS SOON AS RECEIVED.

4. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT MAKE POINT OF IT, BAHNINI INDICATED HE ACTING ON ORDERS FROM KING. PRESUME THERE HAS BEEN BAD NEWS FROM SYRIAN FRONT, PERHAPS IN FORM HEAVY MOROCCAN CASUALTIES. ALTHOUGH IT RAMADAN AND EVERYBODY BUT INFIDELS UP FOR MOST OF THE NIGHT, ASSUME BAHNINI WOULD NOT HAVE CALLED ME AT THIS TIME UNLESS THEY THOUGHT SITUATION SERIOUS.

5. ARE THERE ANY ASSURANCES I CAN PASS TO BAHNINI? REQUEST REPLY BY 0630 GMT IF POSSIBLE.  
PARKER

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 425

PAGE 01 BELGRADE 02601 120854Z

51  
ACTION 004-25

INFO OCT-01 10:00 CIAE-00 DODF-00 YNR-10 NSAE-00 PA-03  
RSC-01 R-01-01 SPC-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SS-15 H-03 NEA-10  
ACDA-19 10:10 SSN-00 7123 W  
084197

R 120814Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4911  
USTA WASHDC  
INFO AMCONSUL ZAGREB

UNCLAS BELGRADE (00)

F.O. 116523  
TAGS: REGR, YO, 00, NY, XP  
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT: MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT

1. EXTENSIVE, PRO-ARAB COVERAGE OF MID-EAST WAR CONTINUES IN YUGOSLAV MEDIA, WITH EDITS CASTIGATING REPORTED ISRAELI BOMBINGS OF CIVILIAN TARGETS IN DAMASCUS AND CAIRO.
2. BELGRADE PRESS OCT 11 CARRIES DESPATCHES FROM BOTH FRONTS, AND CORRESPONDENTS REPORTS FROM ARAB CAPITALS (ALSO AFP, TASS, UPI, AP, REUTERS, MENA), WITH BRIEF NEWS ITEMS (UPI, REUTERS), FROM TEL AVIV. CONTINUING WORLD REACTION TO CONFLICT IS ALSO COVERED. DAILIES POLITIKA AND BORBA INCLUDE LENGTHY TASS OR REPORT WITH EXCERPTS OF FOREIGN SECRETARY HALLIDAY ADDRESS AT SECURITY COUNCIL. TODAY'S POLITIKA ALSO CARRIES (PAGE 4) THREE BRIEF NEWS ITEMS FROM WASHINGTON: PRESIDENT NIXON'S OCT 10 STATEMENT THAT DECISIVE TURNING POINT NOT YET IN SIGHT; MCCLOSKEY PRESS STATEMENT (OCT 10) ON SIVIL SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO MIDDLE-EAST; AND CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST THAT U.S. REPLACE ISRAELI AIR CUSSES.
3. IN OCT 11 (PAGE 2) EDIT, POLITIKA ATTEMPTS EQUATE REPORTED ISRAELI AIR RAIDS ON DAMASCUS AND CAIRO WITH DESTRUCTION BY HITLER'S LUFTWAFFE OF COVENTRY, BELGRADE, AND OTHER EUROPEAN

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PAGE 02 BELGRA 02601 120804Z

CITIES." REFERRING TO REPORT THAT U.S. PLANS TO COMPENSATE ISRAEL FOR EVERY PLANE LOST, "PERHAPS EVEN WITH SURPLUS," EDIT DRAWS CONCLUSION THAT U.S. "CONFIRMS AND REWARDS ROLE OF PHANTOMS IN KILLING INNOCENT POPULATION." SIMILARLY, BORBA IN FRONT-PAGE OCT 11 EDII, "TYRANNY WITHOUT END," DECREES BOMBING OF NON-MILITARY TARGETS AND CLAIMS THAT ISRAEL FEELS ABLE TO ACT WITH IMPUNITY SINCE PROTECTION BY "EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES" ALLOWS NOT ONLY DELIVERY OF WEAPONS, BUT ALSO "RIGHT OF VETO TO BLOCK ACTION OF WORLD ORGANIZATION."

4. BELGRADE TV EVENING NEWS OCT 10 COMMENTED IN HARSH TONE ON ISRAELI AIR RAIDS, DESCRIBING DAYLIGHT AERIAL "MACHINE GUN ATTACKS ON INNOCENT POPULATION" AS REMINISCENT OF "HITLER'S STUKAS." TOON

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**TELEGRAM**

SECRET 002

PAGE 01 STATE 202427

21 11  
ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 PCH-08 ISO-00 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 RSC-01  
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10  
PA-03 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-15 SSO-00  
NSCE-00 USSS-00 INRE-00 OMB-01 OPR-02 /191 R

DRAFTED BY NEA TASK FORCE:WICLUVERTJUS:SKG  
APPROVED BY NEA:EGY:MSTERNER  
S/S-O:RWRIGHT

083003

0 120530Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE  
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH  
AMCONSUL CURACAO BY POUCH  
AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH  
AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE BY POUCH  
XMT AMEMBASSY SUVA  
AMCONSUL CURACAO  
AMEMBASSY BANJUL  
AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE

SECRET STATE 202427

INFORM CONSULS

KUWAIT POUCH MUSCAT DOHA

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: XX  
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

SECRET  
3



*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 202427

1. FOLLOWING FYI IS MIDDLE EAST SITUATION THROUGH EVENING OCT 11.

2. SYRIAN FRONT REMAINED MOST ACTIVE WITH ISRAELIS BREAKING THROUGH SYRIAN LINE IN NORTHERN GOLAN HEIGHTS. BY NIGHTFALL IN AREA ISRAEL CLAIMED TO HAVE ADVANCED 6-8 MILES EAST OF 1967 CEASE-FIRE LINE FOLLOWING BREAKTHROUGH ON FRONT SOME 6-7 MILES WIDE. ACCORDING NEWS REPORTS, ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER DAYAN SPOKE OPTIMISTICALLY EVENING OCT 11 THAT HE BELIEVED SYRIAN ARMY HAD BROKEN IN BATTLE AND THAT BY MORNING SYRIAN FRONT "WILL HAVE ENDED IN ISRAEL'S FAVOR FROM MILITARY POINT OF VIEW." ISRAELI MILITARY COMMENTATOR SAID TODAY THAT 800 OF SYRIA'S 1400 TANKS HAD BEEN DESTROYED. ISRAELI AIR AND NAVAL ATTACKS BEHIND SYRIAN LINES CONTINUED OCT 11, WITH AIR STRIKES AGAINST AIR FIELDS AND PETROLEUM FACILITIES. ISRAELI NAVAL UNITS CONTINUED ATTACKS AGAINST NAVAL AND PETROLEUM FACILITIES ALONG SYRIA'S MEDITERRANEAN COAST, REPORTEDLY SINKING MORE SYRIAN MISSILE BOATS AND SETTING FIRE TO GREEK FREIGHTER AT LATAKIA.

3. EGYPTIAN FRONT REMAINED RELATIVELY STATIC. ISRAELIS BOMBED WEST OF CANAL, CHIEFLY IN PORT SAID AND FURTHER WEST IN NILE DELTA AREA, AND LAUNCHED COMMANDO RAIDS ACROSS CANAL NEAR ITS NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN ENDS. ISRAEL CLAIMS TO HAVE STOPPED EGYPTIAN ATTACKS FROM BRIDGEHEADS EAST TOWARD MITLA PASS AND SOUTH ALONG COAST OF SINAI. ISRAELI CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT ON SYRIAN FRONT HAS ENABLED EGYPTIANS REINFORCE AND SUPPLY BRIDGEHEADS EAST OF CANAL. ISRAEL ESTIMATES EGYPT HAS 700-800 TANKS AND 30-40,000 TROOPS EAST OF CANAL.

4. DIA ESTIMATES OF LOSSES AT END OF FIGHTING ON OCT 10 ARE AS FOLLOWS: EGYPT - 82 A/C AND 300 TANKS, SYRIA - 84 A/C AND 600 TANKS, ISRAEL - 74 A/C AND 550 TANKS.

5. PRESSURE ON KING HUSSEIN TO GO TO WAR UPPED A NOTCH TODAY BY VISIT TO KING OF IRAQI FORMER WHO DELIVERED LETTER FROM IRAQ'S PRESIDENT. KING HUSSEIN HAS PUT ARMED FORCES ON FULL ALERT AND CALLED FOR VOLUNTEERS, BUT SO FAR THIS IS SEEN MORE AS PUBLIC RELATIONS GESTURE

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 202427

TO DEFLECT CRITICISM THAN AS INDICATING INTENT TO JOIN  
IN WAR.

6. SOVIET AIRLIFT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO SYRIA AND  
EGYPT, WHICH STARTED YESTERDAY, IS CONTINUING WITH 10  
NEW FLIGHTS IDENTIFIED IN EARLY HOURS OF OCT 11. U.S.  
MEDIA (QUOTED IN ARAB WORLD) SAY ISRAEL IS ITSELF PICKING  
UP AMMUNITION AND MISSILES IN U.S. LONDON HAS PLACED  
ARMS EMBARGO ON MIDEAST BUT FRANCE HAS RELEASED TWO TANK  
SHIPMENTS, ONE FOR LIBYA AND OTHER FOR SAUDI ARABIA.

7. SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING 1845 EDT PRODUCED MOSTLY  
RHETORIC FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF SYRIA, EGYPT AND ISRAEL.  
EGYPT'S FOMIN ZAYYAT CONDEMNED ISRAEL FOR RAIDS ON  
CIVILIANS IN NILE DELTA, CLAIMING 500 KILLED, AND WARNED  
ISRAEL TO DESIST, IMPLYING RETALIATION ON ISRAELI CIVIL-  
IAN CENTERS. SYRIA'S VICE FOMIN MADE SIMILAR CHARGES.  
EBAN THEN NAMED NUMEROUS ISRAELI CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS  
HIT BY SYRIAN FROG MISSILES AND REVEALED THAT ISRAELI  
PILOT HAD SOME DAYS AGO SUCCESSFULLY DOWNED EGYPTIAN  
AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILE FIRED AT TEL AVIV.

8. CAIRO'S MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) CARRIED ITEM  
ABOUT 1800 EDT THAT U.S. CARRIER-BASED PHANTOM HAD  
STRAFED EGYPTIAN POSITIONS. ATTRIBUTING STORY TO  
"WESTERN DIPLOMATIC SOURCES," MENA SEEMED UNSURE HOW TO  
PLAY STORY, KILLING IT IN ENGLISH SERVICE SOON AFTER ISSU-  
ING IT BUT LETTING IT BE CARRIED BY ARAB SERVICE. DEPT  
PROMPTLY ISSUED STATEMENT TERMING REPORT "MISCHIEVOUS  
AND OUTRAGEOUS LIE."

9. FOREGOING FOR YOUR BACKGROUND ONLY. KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED ABOVE ADDRESSEE.

SECRET

War

SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

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-S  
C

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE  
Situation Report #22

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600 EDT, 10/12/73

Military Situation

N  
RS  
LG

After a quiet night, fighting again resumed on both fronts October 12. At dawn the Israelis reopened their offensive against the Syrians, with heavy air activity reported and both sides claiming enemy aircraft losses. On the Suez front, an artillery battle was underway, suggesting a continuation of yesterday's static pattern.

(LDX)  
(LDX)  
(LDX)  
(LDX)  
HO  
JT

The October 11 fighting closed on the Golan sector with Israelis highly pleased with the outcome. The main Syrian defensive line had been breached with an Israeli salient some 12 kilometers deep. The Syrian commander was faced with a choice of attempting to reinforce the line or drawing his forces back toward Damascus into new defensive positions. An Israeli military commentator last night suggested that the Israeli target would not be Damascus but Katana, an important military center 12 miles south.

Soviet resupply operations continued yesterday and, according to requests for overflight clearances, are expected to continue today, to both Syria and Egypt. Israel claimed that several flights of the large Soviet AN-22 were made into Egypt yesterday. The Israelis complain that the resupply into Syria has had a noticeable effect in restoring some of Syria's SAM capability.

According to the Israelis, 8 Kelt missiles were fired from 4 Egyptian TU-16's at targets in Sinai, little damage being caused. In what must have been a feat of marksmanship, two of these missiles were shot down by Israeli anti-aircraft gunners.

Israel publicly announced that some 35-40 Katyusha rockets were fired last night into Israeli civilian settlements by terrorists from the Lebanese border. Only one person was slightly wounded.

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GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

SECRET/EXDIS

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Sitrep #22 (contd)

Damascus announced that a 4000-ton Soviet merchant ship was severely damaged in an Israeli air attack yesterday on Tartous port (there is some evidence the ship subsequently sank, but apparently without loss of life.)

Political Developments

The Syrians are pressing the Jordanians to send troops to Syria. King Hussain has promised to move an armored brigade to cover a segment of the Syrian line in the south, but believes he can stall the actual despatch of the unit until the evening of October 13. The Iraqi Foreign Minister arrived yesterday in Amman with a plea to support the Syrians, adding further to the pressure of the King. The Iraqi gave a gloomy account of the fighting in Syria, saying the Syrian front was in danger of collapsing, and expressing criticism of the Egyptians for not doing more to relieve pressure on Syria.

The Security Council met yesterday evening to hear Egypt and Israel exchange charges about attacks on civilian centers, Egypt claiming 500 killed in Israeli attacks on targets in the Delta. No resolutions were introduced and the Council made no progress on the question of a ceasefire.

The Department issued a prompt denial of the story put out in Cairo that U.S. carrier-based aircraft had strafed Egyptian positions. We termed the story a "mischevious and outrageous lie". This story and others now appearing that the US is resupplying Israel are beginning to produce some heat for us in the Arab capitals.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OPERATIONS CENTER APPROVED BY <i>[Signature]</i> DEPUTY DELEGATE FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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PAGE 01 HONG K 10301 121040Z

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-10 AF-10 EUR-25 IO-15 NIC-01 ACDA-19

DPW-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07

H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01

SPC-03 SS-15 USIA-15 DRC-01 /168 W

085026

R 120851Z OCT 73  
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8444  
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
USLO PEKING  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONG KONG 10301

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EO 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR CHI

SUBJ: CHOU EN-LAI'S MESSAGES TO ARAB LEADERS

1. PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI OCT 11 SENT NEARLY IDENTICAL MESSAGES OF SUPPORT TO PRESIDENTS SADAT AND ASSAD. REPEATING PEKING'S POSITION THAT THE US AND THE USSR ARE EQUALLY TO BLAME FOR ARAB TROUBLES, CHOU SAID THAT ISRAELI AGGRESSION WAS AN OUTCOME OF THE POLICY "OF AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION PUSHED BY IMPERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE SUPPORT AND CONNIVANCE OF THE SUPERPOWERS." CHOU ALSO REITERATED THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WOULD "UNFAILINGLY SUPPORT" THE ARAB STRUGGLE. CHOU NEVERTHELESS IMPLIED SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN, EXPRESSING THE CONVICTION THAT THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN PEOPLE "PERSEVERING IN UNREMITTING AND PROTRACTED STRUGGLE" WOULD CERTAINLY BE ABLE "TO OVERCOME ANY DIFFICULTIES THAT MAY CROP UP

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PAGE 02 HONG K 10301 121040Z

ON THEIR ROAD OF ADVANCE AND WIN THE VICTORY OF THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST AGGRESSION," DURING HIS BANQUET SPEECH IN HONOR OF CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU ON THE EVENING OF OCT 11, CHOU FAILED TO MENTION THE MID-EAST SITUATION.

2. AN NCNA REPORT FROM CAIRO, OCT 10, PAINTED THE BRIGHTEST PICTURE TO DATE OF EGYPTIAN ARMY SUCCESSES. THE REPORT NOTED THAT THE EGYPTIAN ARMY HAD DESTROYED THE BAR LEV DEFENSE LINE AND FORCED THE ENEMY TO RETREAT CONTINUOUSLY. THE ARTICLE STRESSED THAT THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES WERE "IN HIGH SPIRITS AND FULL OF CONFIDENCE."  
OSBORN

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ROUTINE  
ESA2660GA706  
DE RUESSG #2111 2851650  
R 121640Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7868

INFO AMCONSUL ADANA 51  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3629  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 4122  
USDOCUSOUTH  
USEUCOM  
USMISSION NATU 1727  
USMISSION USUN 4055  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 3196

~~Cyprus~~

S E C R E T NICOSIA 2111

LIMDIS  
EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFUR, CY, IS, UK  
SUBJECT: AKROTIRI, F4'S AND ALLEGATIONS OF AID TO ISRAEL

1. PRO-GOVT "PHILELEFTHEROS" REPORTED THURSDAY THAT 57 U.S. F4'S HAD LANDED AT BRITISH BASE AKROTIRI AND 25 HAD GONE ON TO TURKEY. THIS PRESUMABLY IS VARIANT OF ALLEGATION REPORTED USUN 3869.
2. ON FRIDAY, DESPITE REPORTS OF U.K. DENIALS, "PHILELEFTHEROS" AND LEFTIST PAPERS BEGAN TO EDITORIALIZE AGAINST U.K. USE OF SBAS "EVEN INDIRECTLY" AGAINST ARABS.
3. LEFTIST TREATMENT PREDICTABLE. "PHILELEFTHEROS" FOCUS ON AKROTIRI MAY BE INTENDED TO DISPLAY NON-ALIGNED CREDENTIALS AND TO REMIND BRITS OF PROBLEMS WHICH CYPRUS GOVT WOULD HAVE IF AKROTIRI SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED. THIS ISSUE WILL INTENSIFY LOCALLY IF FIGHTING CONTINUES, AND GOVT WILL BECOME EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO ANY APPEARANCE OF COLLABORATING IN AMERICAN ARMS SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL.
4. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTE THAT "CORONET EAST" OVERFLIGHTS ARE ROUTINELY CLEARED WITH GOVT OF CYPRUS. ALTHOUGH NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO ISRAEL, THESE FLIGHTS WOULD PROBABLY BECOME

\*\*\*\*\* \*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

QUANDT, SFELDT

PSN:001064 PAGE 01 TOR:285/22:29Z DTG:121640Z OCT 73

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CONFIDENTIAL IF THEY OCCURRED IN PRESENT CHARGED ATMOSPHERE. "PEACE ECHO" FLIGHTS EVEN MORE SENSITIVE. DANGER OF LEAKAGE SUBSTANTIALLY LESS, SINCE ONLY U.K. NEAR EAST AIR FORCE AT AKROTIRI IS NOTIFIED. WE UNDERSTAND "PEACE ECHO" FLIGHT SCHEDULED SATURDAY OR SUNDAY.

5. USAF AIRCRAFT HAVE IN PAST USED AKROTIRI AS EMERGENCY ALTERNATE FIELD. WE UNDERSTAND THEY HAVE IN PAST VISITED AKROTIRI WHEN NOT NECESSITATED BY EMERGENCY, POSSIBLY AS RECENTLY AS LAST SUMMER NATO EXERCISE.

6. WE SHOULD FOREWARN RECIPIENTS THAT BRITISH WOULD BE HIGHLY EMBARRASSED, AND WE COULD HAVE SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS HERE, IF U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE TO LAND IN OTHER THAN EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES. "PEACE ECHO" AND "CORONET EAST" FLIGHTS POTENTIALLY DAMAGING BUT OF COURSE MUST BE DECIDED ON BROADER ISSUES THAN POTENTIAL IMPACT ON CYPRUS.

7. EMBASSY INTENDS REFER ANY INQUIRIES RE AMERICAN PLANES AT AKROTIRI TO BRITS, MENTIONING BRITISH DENIAL IN UN.  
GRANT  
BT

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